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Abstract 
Embodied theories of mind tend to be theories of the cognitive half of the mind and to ignore its 
emotional half while a complete theory of the mind should account for both halves. Robots are a new 
way of expressing theories of the mind which are less ambiguous and more capable to generate 
specific and non-controversial predictions than verbally expressed theories. We outline a simple 
robotic model of emotional states as states of a sub-part of the neural network controlling the 
robot's behavior which has specific properties and which allows the robot to make faster and more 
correct motivational decisions, and we describe possible extensions of the model to account for social 
emotional states and for the expression of emotions that, unlike those of current “emotional” robots, 
are really “felt” by the robot in that they play a well-identified functional role in the robot's behavior. 
Introduction 
In the Western cultural tradition the mind tends to be viewed as separated from the body and, in 
accordance with this tradition, the sciences of the mind try to understand the mind with no 
reference to the body. In the last few decades, however, this has changed. The cumulative and fast 
advances of the sciences of the body (neurosciences, evolutionary biology, genetics, the biological 
sciences more generally) make all attempts at studying the mind while ignoring the body less and 
less plausible. In fact, the idea that the mind is embodied and that to understand the mind it is 
necessary to take the body into consideration is being accepted by an increasing number of 
researchers and constitutes the premise of many important current investigations (Barsalou, 1999, 
2008; Robbins and Aydede, 2009). The embodied view of the mind has led to a recognition of the 
importance of the actions with which the organism responds to the stimuli in determining how the 
world is represented in the organism's mind, in contrast to the traditional emphasis on mental 
representations as either entirely abstract or derived only from sensory input. This action-based 
view of the mind underlies a number of important ideas such as the grounding of symbols in the 
interactions of the organism with the physical environment (Harnad, 1990), the mental (neural) 
“simulation” of actions as a crucial component of all sorts of understanding (Gallese et al., 1996; 
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), the mental representation of objects in terms not of their sensory 
properties but of the actions that the objects make possible (affordances; Gibson, 1977), the action-
based nature of categories (Borghi et al., 2002; Di Ferdinando and Parisi, 2004). The embodied view 
of the mind is also reflected in computational models which reproduce the part of the body more 
directly linked to the mind, i.e., the brain (artificial neural networks) and, more recently, the entire 
body of the organism (robotics), and which have abandoned the disembodied view of the mind 
which is at the basis of artificial intelligence and of conceptions of the mind as symbol manipulation. 
However, although the study of the mind can greatly benefit from an embodied conception of the 
mind, it still has to free itself from another tradition of Western culture which constitutes an 
obstacle to a complete understanding of the mind: the mind tends to be identified with cognition, 
that is, with knowing, reasoning, deciding, and acting. But cognition is only half of the mind. The 
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other half of the mind is its emotional half and, although the two halves of the mind continuously 
interact and behavior is a result of both halves, no satisfactory account of the mind can be provided 
if the science of the mind is only “cognitive” science. Today one speaks of “embodied cognition,” 
“grounded cognition,” and the mental representation of objects in terms of the actions with which 
organisms respond to them. But organisms, including humans, do not only have knowledge, goals, 
and the capacity to act. They also have motivations and emotional states which play a crucial role in 
their behavior. Current embodied views of the mind tend to be concerned with the cognitive half of 
the mind but an embodied account of the mind must be extended to the other half of the mind, its 
emotional half and, in fact, some psychologists and neuroscientists are trying to extend the 
embodied conception of the mind to emotions (see, for example, Gallese, 2008; Freina et al., 2009; 
Glenberg et al., 2009). 
Even if one assumes that the mind generally does not contain anything which is unrelated to sensory 
input and motor output (which is what embodied theories assume), the cognitive and the emotional 
halves of the mind may not function in the same way. Input to the brain can be input from the 
environment but also input from inside the body, and output from the brain can be external motor 
output but also changes in the internal organs and systems of the body, and these different sensory 
inputs and motor outputs may have different characteristics and consequences. This is why we need 
models that capture both the cognitive half and the emotional half of the mind and their 
interactions. These models should explicitly indicate both similarities and differences between 
embodied cognition and embodied emotion. 
This also applies to the study of the mind through the construction of computational models or 
robots. Robots are the most appropriate tools for exploring embodied theories of the mind because, 
although in a very simplified form, they reproduce the body of organisms and the physical organ that 
controls the organisms’ behavior (neuro-robots), and this is true for both physically realized robots 
and for robots which are simulated in a computer. However, current robots mostly try to reproduce 
the cognitive half of the mind but they ignore its emotional half. The robots displace themselves in 
the environment, move their arms and reach for objects, turn their eyes and their face, but they do 
not have emotions. Some current robots produce postures and movements of their bodies (mostly, 
the face) that in humans express emotions and they can recognize the expressed emotions of 
humans as a purely perceptual task, but they cannot be said to really have emotions and to really 
understand the emotions of others (Picard, 2000, 2003; Breazeal, 2002; Adolphs, 2005; Canamero, 
2005; Dautenhahn et al., 2009; Robinson and el Kaliouby, 2009; cf. Arbib and Fellous, 2004; Fellous 
and Arbib, 2005). (For an attempt at understanding the functional role of emotions in behavior, see 
Ziemke, 2008.). The reason is quite simple. The cognitive half of the mind is the result of the 
interactions of the brain with the external environment or of processes self-generated inside the 
organism's brain (mental life). Current robots have artificial brains which interact with the external 
environment and, in some cases, can even self-generate inputs and respond to these self-generated 
inputs (Mirolli and Parisi, 2006, 2009; Parisi, 2007). But current robotics is an external robotics: 
robots reproduce the external morphology of an organism's body, the organism's sensory and motor 
organs, and the interactions of the organism's brain with the external environment. In contrast, the 
emotional half of the mind is the result of the interactions of the organism's brain with the 
organism's body and with the organs and systems that are inside the body. If we want to construct 
robots that can be said to really have emotions, what is needed is an internal robotics, that is, robots 
that have internal organs and systems with which the robot's brain can interact (Parisi, 2004). Only 
3 
 
an internal robotics can help us to better understand the emotional half of the mind and to 
construct a complete embodied theory of the mind. 
Computational models and, more specifically, robotic models are important to understand the mind. 
Theories in psychology tend to be expressed verbally but verbally expressed theories have 
limitations because words often have different meanings for different people and because verbally 
expressed theories may be unable to generate specific, detailed, and non-controversial predictions. 
Robots are an alternative way of expressing theories. The theory is used to construct a robot and 
therefore, in a sense, it can be directly observed and it can contain no ambiguity because otherwise 
the robot cannot be constructed. Furthermore, the theory generates many specific, detailed, and 
uncontroversial predictions which are the behaviors exhibited by the robot. These predictions can be 
empirically validated by comparing them with all sorts of empirical facts: the results of behavioral 
experiments, data on the ecology and past evolutionary history of the organism, and data on the 
organism's body and brain. 
As we have said, robotic models are especially appropriate for formulating embodied theories of the 
mind because, by definition, a robot has a body and the robot's behavior clearly depends on its 
having a body. Furthermore, since the brain is part of the body, to be consistent robots should be 
neuro-robots, that is, robots whose behavior is controlled by a system that resembles the structure 
and functioning of the brain, i.e., an artificial neural network. This has the advantage that it becomes 
possible to examine the internal representations contained in the robot's “brain” (the patterns of 
activation and successions of patterns of activation in the robot's neural network) and to determine 
if they are embodied or non-embodied representations, i.e., if they reflect the robot's actions and 
the reactions of the robot's internal organs and systems to sensory input rather than the sensory 
input. (This is more difficult to do with “emotional” robots which are not controlled by neural 
networks but by symbolic systems such as those of Breazeal and Brooks, 2005.) 
What we will do in this paper is describe a number of simple robots that may help us to construct an 
entire theory of mind as made up of a cognitive half and an emotional half. 
The Strategic and the Tactical Level of Functioning of Organisms 
The first step toward the construction of robots which have both a cognitive and an emotional mind 
is to construct robots that have many different motivations which cannot all be satisfied at the same 
time and therefore the robots have to decide at any given time which motivation to pursue with 
their behavior. Current robots tend to have only one motivation. In some cases their behavior is 
complex: for example, they may approach an object with their legs or wheels, reach the object with 
their arm, grasp the object with their hand, and put the object in their mouth. But behind this 
behavior there is a single motivation, say, the motivation to eat. In contrast, a robot's behavior may 
be very simple but the robot has many independent motivations. An example is a robot that has 
both a motivation to eat and a motivation to drink. The behavior which is needed to satisfy the 
motivation to eat or the motivation to drink may be very simple but the robot has to decide which 
motivation to satisfy if the two motivations cannot be both satisfied at the same time. Some current 
robots do have more than one motivation but it is their user which decides which motivation should 
control their behavior at any given time, i.e., what they must do, and in this sense current robots are 
not really autonomous. (For attempts at constructing robots that are motivationally autonomous or 
that take motivational decisions, cf. Brooks, 1986; Maes, 1990, although the last two references are 
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to symbolically controlled robots. The difference between neural network and rule-based 
approaches to motivations and motivational decisions is discussed in Seth, 1998, 2007.) 
Real organisms are different. They have many different and largely independent motivations and 
one of the most important aspects of their behavior is that they have to autonomously decide which 
motivation to pursue at any given time. In fact, the behavior of real organisms has two levels of 
functioning, the strategic or motivational level and the tactical or cognitive level (Ruini et al., 2010). 
At the strategic level the organism has to decide which one of its many different motivations will 
control its behavior at any particular time. At the tactical level, the organism has to execute the 
behavior which is appropriate to satisfy the motivation which has been decided at the strategic level. 
Imagine an organism which lives in an environment containing both food and water and which to 
survive has to both eat and drink. Food and water are located in different places in the environment 
so that, at any given time, the organism has to decide whether to approach and reach food, and 
satisfy its motivation to eat, or to approach and reach water, and satisfy its motivation to drink. 
Once one of the two different motivations has been chosen at the strategic level, the tactical level of 
functioning of the organism generates the appropriate behavior which allows the organism to satisfy 
the motivation. 
How is the decision taken at the strategic level? We assume that the decision is based on a simple 
mechanism. At any given time each motivation has an intensity which may vary from time to time, 
and the organism decides to pursue the motivation which currently has the highest intensity. We use 
the verb “to decide” but what we are talking about is implicitly expressed motivations and a purely 
physical mechanism that compares different motivational intensities, although in complex and 
verbal animals such as humans, the decision mechanism may involve talking to oneself, making 
explicit predictions, and producing explicit evaluations. The intensity of the different motivations is 
determined by two classes of factors: (1) the intrinsic intensity of the different motivations, which 
may depend on the overall adaptive pattern of the organism (e.g., the organism's body needs more 
food than water) or on the properties of the organism's environment (e.g., food is less abundant 
than water in the organism's environment), and (2) the current stimuli arriving to the organism's 
sensors from the external environment (e.g., the organism presently sees food rather than water) or 
from the organism's own body [e.g., the current level of nutrients (hunger) is lower than the current 
level of water (thirst)] or, in more complex animals such as humans, the stimuli which are self-
generated (predicted, imagined, remembered) in the organism's brain. Once one motivation has 
been chosen at the strategic level, the organism produces the behavior that satisfies, or should 
satisfy, the motivation. Notice that since the intensity of the different motivations can change very 
rapidly because of the arrival of new stimuli and for other reasons, the organism should be able to 
shift very quickly from pursuing one motivation to pursuing another motivation, and this may 
happen even if the first motivation has not been satisfied or entirely satisfied. 
That organisms function at two levels, the motivational and the cognitive level, is indicated by the 
fact that an individual may be good at the motivational level but not very good at the cognitive level 
while the opposite may be true for another individual. An individual may be good at choosing to 
satisfy its hunger rather than its thirst because its body needs energy rather than water but then it 
may not be very good at finding food. In contrast, another individual may be very good at finding 
both food and water but it makes the wrong motivational decisions, or is slow at deciding or, even 
more critically, is unable to decide and does nothing. Notice that to stay alive and possibly reproduce 
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an individual should be sufficiently good at both levels since both being unable to decide correctly 
and rapidly and being unable to do what is necessary to satisfy the motivation decided at the 
motivational level may reduce the organism's chances of surviving and reproducing or the 
organism's well-being. 
This indicates that a crucial component of behavior is that the organism's motivational decision 
mechanism must function effectively and efficiently. It must take the correct motivational decisions 
and it must take these decisions at the appropriate time, which in many cases means quickly. This is 
where emotions come in. Emotions are states of the organism's body that allow the motivational 
decision mechanism to function more effectively and more efficiently. Emotional states influence 
the current intensity of the organism's motivations in such a way that the organism functions better 
at the strategic level. The sight of a potential mate might cause an emotional state in the organism 
that increases the probability that the organism will pursue the motivation to mate rather than 
other motivations. The sight of a present danger may induce an emotional state that increases the 
probability that the organism will stop pursuing other motivations and try to avoid the danger, and 
will do this fast. In more complex organisms such as humans, even the thought of a mate or of a 
danger may increase the importance of the motivation to mate or the motivation to avoid the 
danger, with the consequence that the organism will be less likely to pursue other motivations. 
In the next section we describe some simple robots that have to decide among different motivations 
and we show that if the robots have emotions their motivational decisions are more correct and 
efficient. 
Robots that Have Emotions 
We have constructed a robot which lives in an environment containing both food and a predator 
(Parisi and Petrosino, 2010; Ruini et al., 2010). To remain alive the robot has both to eat the food 
and to avoid being killed by the predator. The predator is not always present but when it appears 
the robot has to cease looking for food and escape from the predator. The neural network 
controlling the robot's behavior has sensory input units encoding the presence and location of both 
food and predator, motor output units encoding the movements that allow the robot to displace 
itself in the environment, and an intermediate layer of internal units. To eat the robot has to 
approach and reach the food elements while to avoid being killed by the predator the robot has to 
avoid physical contact with the predator. The connection weights of the robot's neural network are 
developed using a genetic algorithm with a population of robots that reproduce selectively and with 
the constant addition of random variations to the inherited connection weights (Mitchell, 1998). The 
robots are simulated Khepera robots (Nolfi and Gigliotta, 2010). They have a circular body with two 
wheels allowing the robot to displace itself in the environment and sensory organs allowing the 
robot to perceive what is in front of the robot within a given distance from the robot. 
We compare two populations of robots. In one population the robots’ neural network has the 
architecture we have already described. In the other population we add to the robot's neural 
network an “emotional circuit” made up of a certain number of units which receive activation from 
the sensory units encoding the presence of the predator and send their activation to either the 
internal units or the output units and therefore influence the robot's behavior. These emotional 
units have special properties compared to the other internal units of the robots’ neural network. 
They have no “bias,” they have an activation threshold, and an emotional unit is not only active in 
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the particular cycle in which activation arrives to the emotional unit from the input units but its 
activation may persist in subsequent cycles. The unit's activation threshold and the parameters that 
control how the activation of a unit persists in subsequent cycles all have evolved values. (For a 
more detailed description of the emotional circuit and of the results of the simulations, see Parisi 
and Petrosino, 2010.) 
The results of the simulations show that the robots with the emotional circuit reach higher level of 
performance (they live longer) than the robots which do not have the emotional circuit in their 
brain. If we look at the robots’ behavior, we see that they immediately cease looking for food and fly 
away when the predator appears, thereby reducing the probability of being reached and killed by 
the predator. The robots without the emotional circuit are less fast at shifting from the motivation to 
eat to the motivation to avoid being killed by the predator, and this leads to shorter lives. 
In other simulations the robots have to make other motivational decisions: they have to decide 
whether to eat or drink, whether to eat or look for a mate, whether to eat or take care of their 
offspring, or whether to eat or rest when their body incurs some physical damage that can be healed 
by resting. The neural network of the robots has sensory units, motor units, and an intermediate 
layer of internal units and, in addition, it has internal inputs units encoding the current level of 
energy inside their body (hunger sensors) and, for the robots that have to both eat and drink, also 
internal input units encoding the level of water (thirst sensors), while the robots which can incur 
physical damage have internal input units encoding the presence of physical damage (pain sensors). 
All these robots have to take motivational decisions, and their “fitness” depends on both their ability 
to take the appropriate motivational decisions with the required rapidity and their ability to produce 
the behavior which satisfies the motivation which has been chosen. The results of the simulations 
indicate that for all robots the possession of an emotional circuit allows them to take better and 
more rapid motivational decisions so that their fitness is higher than the fitness of the robots lacking 
the emotional circuit. 
The robots we have described respond to the input from the external environment and/or from 
within their body not only with actions but also with emotional states, i.e., states of their emotional 
circuit, that make their motivational decisions more effective and efficient and therefore their 
behavior more “fit.” The emotional circuit of these robots is very simple. The emotional units receive 
activation from the external environment (e.g., the sight of a predator) and/or from inside the body 
(e.g., the current level of energy in the robot's body) and they send their activation to the internal 
units or to the motor units of the robot's neural network, thereby influencing the robot's behavior. 
Real organisms are more complex. The equivalents of our robots’ emotional units send their 
activation to various internal organs and systems such as the heart, the gut, the hormonal system, to 
the muscles of the face, and to other parts of the body, and receive activation from all these parts of 
the body, and it is this activation which influences the organism's motivational decisions and 
therefore the organism's behavior. In fact, as originally proposed by James and Lange (1922), and 
recently elaborated by Damasio (1994, 2004) and LeDoux (1996, 2000), felt emotional states are 
largely the product of these interactions. However, although very simple, our robots can be said to 
have emotions and to implement an embodied theory of the other half of the mind. 
Emotions and Sociality 
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The robots we have described in the preceding section do not have sociality. They live alone in their 
environment, and predators, mates, and offspring are not robots themselves but are only objects 
which are present in the environment and are perceived by the robots. Many animals, and especially 
humans, are social, which means that they live with conspecifics and a large portion of their adaptive 
pattern consists in being able to interact appropriately with conspecifics. What is the relation of 
emotions to sociality? 
Emotions and sociality are linked in two distinct ways. Many motivations in social animals can be 
satisfied only with the participations of conspecifics, i.e., they are social motivations. For example, in 
species that reproduce sexually, an individual cannot satisfy its motivation to have offspring without 
the participation of an individual of the opposite sex. Since emotional states help the strategic level 
of functioning of the organism to take better motivational decisions, social animals tend to have 
social emotional states that allow them to take better motivational decisions when these decisions 
concern social motivations. The other way in which emotions and sociality are related is that 
emotional states are associated with postures and movements of the organism's body which can be 
perceived by other individuals and therefore can inform these individuals about the emotional states 
of the organism. 
Examples of social motivations are the motivation to mate with another individual, the motivation to 
take care of one's offspring, and the motivation to be helped or to avoid being damaged by another 
individual. All these motivations enter into the motivational decisions of the organism which has to 
decide which motivation to pursue at any given time. Hence, social organisms tend to have social 
emotional states which regulate the current intensity of their social motivations and positively 
influence their motivational decisions that have to take into account social motivations. 
It may not be too difficult to construct robots that have social emotions. In some recently completed 
simulations, the robots can be either female or male and to reproduce a robot has to mate with a 
robot of the opposite sex. The robots live in an environment with both food and other robots of the 
two sexes and to leave their genes to the next generation they have both to eat to remain alive and 
to approach and reach a robot of the opposite sex to reproduce. Female and male robots have 
different colors so that they can be recognized as females or males by conspecifics. But there is a 
further complication. After reproductively mating with a male robot, a female robot cannot 
reproduce for a certain number of time steps and during this non-reproductive period the female 
robot changes its color and this change of color is perceived by the other robots. A pregnant female 
knows its current state because its neural network has internal input units encoding the pregnant 
state of its body. The results show that while the average number of offspring is necessarily identical 
for females and males, males have more reproductive variability than females, that is, there are 
males with many offspring and males with very few or no offspring while females all have more or 
less the same number of offspring. Furthermore, the robots alternate appropriately between looking 
for food and looking for mates, with reproductive females behaving differently toward males 
compared to non-reproductive females, and males approaching only reproductive females. 
The next step is to add an emotional circuit to the neural network of these robots and to see if in this 
case too the possession of the emotional circuit leads to better performance. What would make the 
states of this circuit social emotional states is that, unlike the emotional states of the robots 
described in the preceding Section, the emotional states of these robots would be activated by the 
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sight of a conspecific and they would allow a robot to take better motivational decisions about what 
to do socially. 
This leads us to the second aspect that links emotions to sociality. The emotional states of the robots 
we have just described are social only in the sense that they are associated with social motivations 
but they are not social in the sense that they are expressed, that is, they are communicated to other 
individuals. What appears to be really important to understand the role of emotions in sociality is to 
construct robots that express their emotional states and in this manner cause other individuals to 
know their emotional states and to be influenced in their behavior by this knowledge. 
How can we construct robots that express emotions they really have? As we have said, current 
“emotional” robots express emotions that they do not have, that is, that do not play any functional 
role in their behavior. To construct robots that express emotional states which they really have it is 
necessary to link the emotional circuit of the robots we have described in the preceding section to 
postures and movements of the robot's body that can be perceived by other robots. In the robots 
described in the preceding section, the emotional circuit influences the manner in which the robot 
responds to both external and internal inputs but it has no interactions with the rest of the robot's 
body. As we have said, this is not so in real organisms, in which the emotional circuit of the brain 
sends its activation to other parts of the body and these parts of the body respond by sending 
activation to the brain. As we have also said, some of the parts of the body activated by the 
emotional circuit are external and therefore their state or change of state (postures and 
movements) can be perceived by another individual. In this way an individual may know the 
emotional states of another individual by observing the postures and movements of the body of the 
other individual that result from the activations sent to the body by its emotional units. 
Why should the emotional states of an individual be reflected (expressed) in the postures and 
movements of the individual's body and therefore be accessible to the sensors of another 
individual? Why should the other individual be able to understand the emotional states of the 
individual by perceiving the postures and movements of its body? Postures and movements of the 
body may be simply a by-product of having emotional states, with no specific adaptive value. But the 
richness of the expression of emotions in some animals, and especially humans, seems to indicate 
that expressing one's emotions has adaptive value and has evolved for this reason. This adaptive 
value is informing other individuals of one's emotional states. The adaptive value appears to consist 
in two things: predictability and manipulation. For the other individual it may have adaptive value to 
know the emotional states of the first individual by perceiving the postures and movements of its 
body. Adapting to the environment is to a large extent to be able to predict the future state of the 
environment given its present state in order to prepare for the future state. For social animals an 
important component of their adaptive environment is constituted by conspecifics in that many of 
the motivations of an individual can only be satisfied with the participation of other individuals. 
Therefore, for a social individual it is important to be able to predict the behavior of other 
individuals, and knowing the emotional states of other individuals is a powerful predictor of their 
behavior. This may explain why social animals (of some complexity) tend to attend to and to be able 
to understand the emotional states of other individuals as these emotional states are expressed by 
the postures and movements of certain parts of their body. But why should an individual care to 
express its emotional states through the postures and movements of its body so that another 
individual can know them? The explanation in this case is not in terms of predictability but in terms 
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of manipulation, where manipulation is behaving in such a way that the other individual will behave 
in some desired manner. In other words, an individual will express its emotional states because this 
will induce another individual which is informed of such emotional states to behave in ways which 
are desirable for the first individual. 
Both functions of the expression of emotional states can be simulated with robots possessing an 
emotional circuit which interacts with the robot's body so that specific states of the circuit will cause 
specific postures and movements in the robot's body which can be perceived by other robots. This 
will allow the first robot to let its emotional state be known by other robots and therefore to 
influence their behavior and will allow the other robots to predict the behavior of the first robot. 
Being able to predict X is an important component of (or perhaps the same thing as) understanding 
X. What is for individual A to understand individual B? The embodied theory of sociality says that A 
understands B by “simulating” B's perceived actions in its own brain (Gallese, 2010). But the 
behavior of B does not only consist in doing actions but also in expressing emotions, and sociality 
implies understanding not only B's actions but also B's expressed emotions. Hence, a more complete 
theory of sociality proposes that A understands B not only by observing B's actions and “simulating” 
these actions in its own brain but also by observing B's expressed emotions and “simulating” these 
emotions in its own brain–body. (Remember that, while the cognitive half of the mind is a product of 
the brain, the emotional half is a product of the interaction between the brain and the body.) There 
is an accumulating experimental literature on the role of expressed emotions in sociality. For 
example, Bayliss et al. (2007) have shown that how objects are affectively evaluated by an individual 
is influenced by the gaze and emotional expression of another individual, and Ferri et al. (2010) that 
the emotional expression of another individual may affect the goal-directed behavior of the 
observer. These are among the experimental results which our robots that have emotions should be 
able to replicate. 
Emotions and Language 
An extension of the embodied view of mind to language proposes, and tries to show with 
experiments, that we understand nouns by internally representing in our brain the action with which 
we respond to the object designated by the noun and we understand verbs by “simulating” in our 
brain the action designated by the verb (Fischer and Zwaan, 2008). However, if the mind has two 
halves, the cognitive and the emotional half, an embodied conception of language should give an 
account of both the cognitive and emotional meanings of words. What we do in this section is 
describe some simple robots that (begin to) have language, and to suggest how words can evoke in 
these robots not only a cognitive meaning but also an emotional meaning. 
Most words are sounds, or phono-articulatory movements that produce acoustic sounds, which co-
vary with specific objects (nouns) or actions (verbs). If objects and actions evoke emotional states, 
words will also evoke emotional states. The “cognitive” orientation of most current theories of the 
mind can also be seen in the privilege accorded to the “cognitive” component of the meanings of 
words rather than to their “emotional” component, where the cognitive component refers to the 
perceptual properties of the object designed by a noun or to the action designed by a verb while the 
emotional component refers to the emotional states evoked by the noun or verb. But if we want to 
construct robots that can be said to have language, it will be necessary that their words evoke 
emotional states, not only “cognitive meanings,” in other robots. This requires an appropriate 
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robotic model of the meanings of words. We will now briefly describe such a model. (For a more 
detailed description of the model, see Parisi, 2010. For robotic models of nouns and verbs, see 
Cangelosi and Parisi, 2001.) 
Our robots live in an environment with other robots and their neural network is made up of two sub-
networks, the non-linguistic sub-network (NoL) and the linguistic sub-network (L). NoL is made of 
input units encoding non-linguistic sensory input (perceived objects and perceived actions of 
another robot) and output units encoding non-linguistic actions (e.g., reaching and grasping an 
object). L has input units encoding linguistic sounds (produced by another robot) and output units 
encoding phono-articulatory movements that produce linguistic sounds. Both NoL and L have a layer 
of internal units which connects the input units to the output units. In addition, the two internal 
layers also have horizontal connections linking the internal units of NoL to those of L, and vice versa. 
Given these horizontal connections, perceiving an object can lead to executing a non-linguistic action 
but also to executing a phono-articulatory action, i.e., producing the word which designates the 
object. And hearing a word may lead to reproducing the word by executing the appropriate 
movements of one's phono-articulatory organs (imitating the sound of the word) or to executing a 
non-linguistic action. When the robot learns language (which, in children, begins at 1 year of age), 
the robots learns the appropriate connection weights for these horizontal connections. What is the 
role of these connection weights? In the robot's social experience one specific linguistic sound tends 
to co-vary with one specific object or action, and vice versa. The robot incorporates these co-
variations in the connection weights of its neural network so that when the robot hears a linguistic 
sound and activation spreads from the internal layer of L to the internal layer of NoL, the pattern of 
activation evoked in the internal units of NoL is more or less the same pattern of activation evoked 
by perceiving the object or action which co-varies with the linguistic sound. When the robot 
perceives an object or action, activation spreads from the internal units of NoL to the internal units 
of L, which causes the robot to produce the sound which in its experience co-varies with that object 
or action. In other words, the robot is able to both produce and understand language. 
A crucial assumption of the model we have described is that there is no entity in the robot's neural 
network which can be called the meaning of a word. If we assume that the internal units of NoL have 
internal connections linking the units of the same layer, when an activation pattern is evoked in the 
internal units of NoL, this activation pattern will evoke a second activation pattern in the same or 
other units, then a third, and so on, so that the initial activation pattern is only the first step of a 
process which has no natural end and no fixed boundaries and is influenced by a number of factors 
such as the linguistic and non-linguistic context in which the word is being experienced by the robot, 
inter-individual differences among the robots, the frequency with which a word has been 
experienced by the robot, and others. Notice that the internal layer of NoL is not a specialized 
“semantic module” but is the entire brain (minus the L sub-network). This implies that the spreading 
of activation in NoL can invade the emotional circuit of the robot's neural network and in this 
manner it can trigger emotional states in the robot. These emotional states triggered by words 
constitute the emotional meaning of words. Words have emotional meaning if a word co-varies in 
the robot's experience with non-linguistic experiences that cause emotional states in the robot. 
This of course is only a first step toward a robotic account of the emotional meaning of words. Here 
is a list of interesting questions that this account should be able to answer. Why, while all words 
have a cognitive meaning, only some words appear to have an emotional meaning? Why the 
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cognitive meaning of words appears to be more well-defined, articulated, and specific than their 
emotional meaning? How can we capture this fact with our robots? Words often appear to have 
emotional meaning not in isolation but in the context of other words, i.e., in sentences (Havas et al., 
2007). Why this is so? In some experiments it has been shown that abstract words tend have more 
emotional meaning than concrete words (Kousta et al., 2009a). Why? Other experiments indicate 
that emotional words are processed more rapidly than non-emotional words (Kousta et al., 2009b). 
Why? 
Summary 
Theories expressed as robots have two important advantages compared to verbally expressed 
theories: they are unambiguous because they refer to things that can observed and measured and 
they generate many detailed and non-controversial empirical predictions, which are the behaviors of 
the robot and what happens in the robot's “brain.” We have described some robotic models that 
begin to address the question of how to develop a theory of mind that takes into consideration both 
the cognitive and the emotional halves of the mind. We have shown that if we add an emotional 
circuit to the neural network that controls a robot's behavior, the robot's behavior becomes more 
effective because the emotional circuit allows the robot to take more correct and faster motivational 
decisions. Unlike current “emotional” robots, robots that possess this circuit can be said to actually 
have emotions in that one can show that the circuit plays a clear functional role in the robot's 
behavior. We have then addressed the question of how emotions are related to sociality and we 
have distinguished two aspects of this relation. Robots can have social motivations, that is, 
motivations that can only satisfied with the participation of conspecifics, and emotions can be said 
to be social if they cause the robot to make better motivational decisions when the choice set 
includes social motivations. The other link between emotions and sociality is the expression of 
emotions. The emotional circuit allows the brain (neural network) to interact not only with what is 
inside the body but also with the external body, causing postures and movements of some parts of 
the body (especially the face) that can be perceived by other robots. We have advanced the 
hypothesis that this expression of emotions has two adaptive advantages: it allows a robot that 
expresses its emotions to manipulate the behavior of other robots that perceive the expressed 
emotions and it allows the robot which perceives the emotions expressed by another robot to 
predict and anticipate the behavior of the other robot. Finally, we have briefly discussed which type 
of neural network should control the behavior of robots that have language and how words can have 
both cognitive and emotional meanings for a robot. 
The robotic models we have described are very simple and very tentative and one still has to show 
that they are able to explain (reproduce) the constantly accumulating empirical facts about brain 
and behavior that involve the other half of the mind. (For some attempts at simulating the brain 
involved in emotions, see Rolls and Treves, 1998; Rolls, 1999; Avila-Garcia and Canamero, 2004.) 
Furthermore, we have said that current “emotional robots” do not actually have emotions because 
emotions do not play any clearly identifiable functional or adaptive role in their behavior, but the 
results obtained with our robotic models should be compared with those of alternative models, both 
robotic and non-robotic. An important test of the models will be their ability to reproduce not only 
the results of experiments but also other empirical facts such as inter-individual differences in the 
emotional half of the mind, i.e., differences in personality and character rather than in cognitive 
ability, the pathologies of the emotional half of the mind, i.e., psychiatric and psychological 
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disturbances rather than neurological ones (Stein and Ludik, 2008), and the expression of the 
emotional half of the mind in the production and appreciation of works of art. 
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